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Cameroonian feymen and Nigerian ‘419’ scammers:  
two examples of Africa’s ‘reinvention’ of the global 
capitalism 
 
 
Basile Ndjio1 
 
 
One can disagree with the authors of The Criminalization of the State in Africa (Bayart et al. 
1999), who by locating the growth of criminal enterprises at the very heart of the African 
postcolonial states, or by making a connection between fraudulent economic practices and tenure 
of public office, and between criminal entrepreneurs and holders of political power in Africa, 
tend to overlook the fact that much of African criminal activities and unlawful businesses are 
now carried out outside the Black continent. In addition, African criminal networks are slowing 
re-orientating themselves towards western countries ―and to a lesser extent the Persian Gulf― 
which have become over time the major centres and main bases for their unlawful operations. 
This is the case with many Europe-based west African criminal operators who now oversee the 
growing underground or shadow economy in the south of Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the 
Netherlands, North West of London, and in many banlieues (suburbs) or neighbourhoods of Paris 
(MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000; Ndjio 2006).  
Yet, it will be a bad faith not to acknowledge the fact that Bayart and his collaborators are 
right in their observation that the social capital of African economies is increasingly taking the 
form of a widespread use of deception and 'dirty tricks' (1999: 70), and that in many African 
countries, crime, corruption, confidence trick, business frauds and financial deceptions now 
influence business activities, as well as they dominate the mode of conducting economic 
transactions. They are also right when they point out the fact that many African social actors 
have managed to re-appropriate to their own advantage the economic reforms imposed upon 
them by western institutions (i.e. World Bank and IMF), as much as they have succeeded in 
                                                 
1 Dr. Basile Ndjio is a Lecturer at the University of Douala (Cameroon), and was a visiting fellow at the African Studies 
Centre, Leiden in April-June 2008. He received his doctorate in social science (Anthropology) at the University of 
Amsterdam  in 2006. 
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capturing the contradictory insertion of their countries into the market economy and global 
capitalism. They did it not only by developing new modes of acquisition of wealth which no 
longer follow conventional economic strategies and norms, but also by inventing their own 
economic practices which can be morally and judicially classified as criminal or illicit. 
Symptomatic of this African inventive spirit is the emergence since the late 1980s and early 
1990s in most African countries of new modes of accumulation of wealth which, according to 
some analysts dramatize the criminalization of the state (Bayart et al. 1999) and the 
informalization of African economies (MacGaffey 1998: 37-50; Roitman 2005; Spring and 
McDade 1994). The particularity of this new African economic entrepreneurship is that it 
dissolves the difference between criminal behaviour and legitimate profit-seeking, between 
normal economic activities and vulgar criminal practices. This is particularly the case with the 
new generation of African businessmen and entrepreneurs who are for the most part notorious 
for their passion for shady business, dirty tricks, fraud and smuggling, and especially their 
inclination for taking an unfair advantage of their business partners’ trust (Bayart 1994; Hibou 
1999: 70-113; MacGaffey 1987, 1994: 189-204; Ndjio 2002a and b; Warnier 1993). For 
example, in an interesting article about what he called 'La ''bigarrure'' des patrons Camerounais' 
(variegation of Cameroonian patrons), the French anthropologist Jean-Pierre Warnier (1994: 175-
201) showed that the actions of many of them were informed by unethical principles and 
immoral values such as deception, unscrupulousness, double-dealing and duplicity. In many 
respects, the behaviour of these Cameroonian entrepreneurs, who excelled in the art of juggling 
with laws, evading tax, doctoring their accounts or faking official documents in order to mislead 
tax inspectors or customs officers, contrasted with the business ethics and moral principles 
preached for example by Benjamin Franklin and other Puritanist ideologues of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.  
 More interesting is the fact that these new economic practices, which straddle the licit and 
the illicit, the ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ economy (Ndjio 2006), embody the ambition or bid of 
many African businessmen and entrepreneurs to ‘reinvent’ the global capitalism —a term 
borrowed from Bayart (1994). By 'reinvention of global capitalism', I mean here not only the 
remodelling of its rationality and logics, but also the questioning of the ethical codes, principles 
and laws that govern economic activities and commercial transactions at both local and 
international levels. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, advanced-fee fraud and confidence 
trick commonly characterized in Nigeria as '419' scam― in reference to a section of the Nigerian 
criminal code that deals with business malpractices at large and a specific fraud―, and in 
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Cameroon as feymania2, have become one of the most noticeable manifestations of this Africans' 
endeavour to reinvent the global capitalism. Likewise, Nigerian ‘419’ scammers and 
Cameroonian feymen (as international swindlers and confidence tricksters are generally called in 
Cameroon), who through confidence trick and sophisticated business frauds manage to 
accumulate considerable fortunes in a spam of little time, have become the embodiment of new 
forms of capitalism− call it adventure or criminal capitalism− which essentially live on 
fraudulent practices. 
This paper which is essentially based on ethnographic research conducted between 2000 
and 2005 in Cameroon, and in some European countries (France, Great Britain, Germany and 
The Netherlands) is the continuation of my previous research on the moral economy of trickery 
and deceit that yields ‘unconventional’ and ‘unethical’ modes of wealth production in 
contemporary Cameroon (Ndjio 2001, 2006). The main objective of this paper is to show 
through the example of Nigerian advance-fee scammers and Cameroonian international 
swindlers how since the mid 1990s, young marginalized African youths have been endeavouring, 
not only to make the most of accumulative opportunities provided by the present global 
capitalism, but also to reframe this dominant mode of capitalization of riches; that is, to corrupt 
its conventional norms and systems of values. This study will show that one of the main schemes 
developed by these young African ‘criminal’ entrepreneurs and adventure businessmen consists 
in converting the global capitalism into a global economy of swindle and fraud.  
This paper is divided into three parts: the first section makes a comparative analysis 
between the art of feymania and advance-fee fraud of which young Bamileke from the Western 
region of Cameroon (see Malaquais 2001:101-18; Ndjio 2001) and Igbo in the South-East of 
Nigeria (Smith et al. 1999, Smith 2007) are key actors. The second part of the research discusses 
the internationalisation, of both advance-fee fraud and feymania-related practices, which seems 
to go along with the criminalisation of the West by some West African transnational confidence 
tricksters and fraudsters who have found greener pastures in many western countries. The third 
section explores this African reinvention of global capitalism. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2Historically, the term feymania was popularized in the early 1990s as a result of the emergence of a group of wealthy 
young conmen and tricky businessmen who came to be known by the public as feymen. The concept 'feymania' derives 
from the local urban vernacular expression ‘fey’ which, according to many informants, is the distortion of the English 
word ‘fool.' Malaquais (2001:101-18) rather derives the expression feymania from the French word faire, which also 
means: 'deceiving someone'. As she explains, the art of feymania is the art of ‘faire’ or ‘feyre:’ the skill of cheating 
someone.' 
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The art of feymania and '419' scam 
 
Giving a clear-cut and unequivocal definition of the concepts of ‘feymania’ and 'advance-fee 
fraud' is not an easy task, especially because one is dealing with such elusive and fuzzy 
expressions, which allow for various and, sometimes, contradictory interpretations that often 
confuse the analyst. This exercise is all the more difficult since in both Cameroonian and 
Nigerian popular discourses, the terms ‘feymania’ and ‘419’ scam have become an all-purpose 
concept for explaining illicit forms of wealth accumulation, unlawful economic activities, riches 
acquired by occult means, ill-gotten fortunes, and above all fantastic forms of wealth creation, 
which are officially unsanctioned because they derive from business activities or economic 
practices which contravene conventional norms and moral values, and especially circumvent 
official economic regulatory channels. In the local popular understanding, the terms also account 
for 'any behaviour that relies on dissimulation, illusion, or some other manipulation of the truth 
in order to facilitate gain or advantage’ as Smith (2007:20) has explained about Nigerian 
advance-fee fraud. Moreover, feymania and ‘419’ scam are more and more associated with all 
sorts of immoral demeanours such as deceit, duplicity, confidence trick, embezzlement, 
corruption, treachery and dishonesty. For example, it is common to read in a local press in both 
countries that the government and its opposition are practicing feymania or ‘419’ politics, 
because of the former’s skill at misleading international organizations and manipulating its 
political opponents (by means of bribe), and the latter’s propensity to lust after ministerial posts 
or to connive with the incumbent regime. People also use the same words to point out deceitful 
and dishonest behaviours of their fellow countrymen. For example, the folks will say about a 
cunning and unscrupulous merchant who deceives his/her customers by selling them fake 
products, an unfaithful husband who keeps several mistresses out of his wife’s knowledge, or a 
dishonest woman who extorts money from her naïve lovers by fooling them into believing that 
they have fathered her unborn child, that they have played their victims a feymania or '419', or 
will brand them ‘419’ or fey (wo) men. So is the corrupt bureaucrat who uses his/her 
administrative position to siphon the state funds or a dishonest student who cheats during class 
exams (Ndjio 2006; Smith 2007: 53-87).  
This inflation of meaning sometimes overshadows the fact that in the mid 1980s in Nigeria 
and early 1990s in Cameroon, when people spoke of ‘419’ and feymania, they generally referred 
to the ‘ability to attain wealth through witchcraft, trickery and devilish intelligence (and not 
through violence)’ (Hibou 2004: 7). Indeed, these expressions initially made reference to a 
specific practice of fraud which involved money-doubling, wheeling-dealing, sophisticated bank 
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frauds and financial deceptions. As Béatrice Hibou (1999:105) explains about the practice of 
feymania:  
In general feymen organize confidence tricks, frauds and financial deceptions. Their hallmark 
is to eschew the use of violence, and to achieve their ends by pure deception. Feymen persuade 
their victims that they are being offered fabulous bargains. They are adept at selling goods 
which do not in fact exist, and at proposing non-existing projects to development and aid 
agencies so as to defraud foreign embassies. There are cases of some who claim to be the King 
of Cameroon. Others claim to be able to multiply banknotes.  
Yet, the critical question many readers might ask is: How do these young con(wo)men manage to 
extort huge amounts of money from their victims who are often experienced financiers, 
entrepreneurs or businessmen? What devilish tricks do they resort to take the dupes in? My own 
experience with a group of young feymen from Paris could help shed light not only on the 
tricksters’ spectacular coups, but also their stunning intelligence and cynicism. Indeed, during the 
summer of 2002 (June-August), I spent more than two months among a ring gang of young 
Cameroonian swindlers whose ethnic and linguistic homogeneity made them impermeable to 
outsiders. These young transnational confidence tricksters were specialized in money-doubling, 
and in what my informants generally referred to as wash-wash, eksi or kaolo. All these pidgin 
terms account for the ‘black money scam’. How does the feymen's trick work?  
In general, a suitcase or trunk allegedly full of genuine money (generally $ 100 bills) is 
shown to the mougou (dupe or gullible person), as ordinary Nigerians and Cameroonians call it. 
However, the notes are all black and the prospective victim is told that they have been ostensibly 
coated with a special substance in order to transport them safely. The blackening of the notes is 
usually caused by a Vaseline and iodine solution. The con artist will make use of his ‘devilish 
intelligence’ to use Hibou’s words (2004: 7), to persuade the mougou to purchase a special 
cleaning solution at a cost between $ 100,000 and $ 500,000. The so-called expensive chemical 
which is allegedly necessary to remove the black substance used to disguise the notes as cash 
from the authorities, is in fact a mixture of washing up liquid and any other solution with an 
unusual odour and colour which the victim will not be able to detect easily. To win over the dupe 
who is generally a wealthy Arab or Asian businessman, or a white-collar Westerner, the 
confidence trickster will select randomly between two and four notes from the case. In front of 
the mougou, the hustler will wash them in a tiny portion of the solution, which he has brought 
with him, returning them to their original form as real bank notes. They are given to the mark 
who is asked to spend them or get them checked at the bank or any financial institution to 
confirm their authenticity. In reality of course, the con artist knows perfectly well which notes he 
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is selecting and takes the only ones that are there, the remainder being cut-to-size paper. A really 
dexterous trickster will even invite the gullible to choose notes to clean and use a well-practiced 
sleight of hand to trick the fool into selecting the genuine ones. As the case(s) will contain 
various amounts ranging from $ 5 million to $ 20 million, this seems like a ‘magical deal,’ which 
leads the dupe nicely into magical tricks. Unfortunately, it is only later that the mougou discovers 
that he/she has been conned. Garas, a ‘retired’ feyman who claims to be one of the initiators of 
feymania–related activities in Cameroon, has revealed how cunning Cameroonian confidence 
tricksters manage to get money from some naïve and avaricious businessmen or politicians by 
trapping them into signing over major assets, or by making them believe that the feyman with 
whom they are dealing has a magical power to increase their capital. As he has explained in one 
Cameroonian newspaper3: 
In 1991, I met a Greek businessman in Istanbul and told him that I could make him become 
very rich, if he agreed to go into business with me. I explained to him that I could fabricate 
several $ million notes. To prove him that I could make it, I produced some copies of $ 100 
notes. He took them and went to many banks to check. A few hours later, he came back and 
told me that all the notes were genuine. The man was now convinced of my technique. He 
agreed to be my business partner. I ended up getting $ 500,000 from the mougou and 
disappeared (translation is mine, BN) 
Some readers will certainly dismiss this account as entirely imaginary or unreal for it seems 
almost impossible to delude people with such simple a scheme. But what the sceptics are likely 
to forget is that feymen, like other tricksters, are above all smooth talkers and professional 
crooks who know not only how to awaken the passion of greed that lies dormant in every man, 
but also to win over their victims with enticing proposals and convincing arguments. For 
example, one member of the gang of feymen mentioned earlier, once confided in me that he and 
his acolytes easily deceived their victims because they were either broutoukou (naive or gullible) 
or had de longs yeux (to be greedy). According to the young trickster, as long as there are people 
who still believe in godsends or want to make a fast buck, feymania-related activities will keep 
thriving. My informant himself was amazed how simple it was to convince people to hand over 
their property and huge sums of cash to an unknown person. But, despite the generalization of 
such swindling operations in many Western countries, and the growing number of victims of 
financial deceptions2, very few cases of confidence tricks are disclosed or reported to the law 
                                                 
3 Cf. Le Messager, 10 May 2001: 8. 
2 For example, according to the online newspaper, ThisisNewNottingham, (22 May, 2004) which quotes the Chief 
Constable of the Nottingham Police, several hundred of individuals and businesses within the county are targeted over a 
year by feymen and other West African criminal networks that operate in the United Kingdom. We learn from the same 
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enforcement agencies. The sentiment of guilt and shame that most of the victims of feymen’s art 
of deception generally feel, added to the fear of being blamed for their greedy spirit, or charged 
with criminal conspiracy drives many to keep silent about their distress. As the case of a British 
family from Nottingham, who lost more than £100,000 in an elaborate scam set up by one 
trickster shows, victims of feymen’s confidence tricks are usually too embarrassed to report their 
loss to the police3. 
As regards the notorious Nigerian ‘419’ which has now gained a worldwide reputation, 
both the popular and academic literature about this scam seems to suggest that Nigerian 
fraudsters are rather specialized in advance-fee schemes and bank frauds. The former are 
generally perpetrated by underdogs or young amateur criminals who are also attracted by the 
prospect of fast wealth that ‘419’activities yield, and sometimes by ordinary Nigerians who 
make use of one of the various ruses of ‘419’ in order to achieve their own economic aspirations, 
or to get round the conditions of liability that impinge on their lives. The scam consists in 
ensnaring a dupe into advancing fees and providing information about his/her bank account, 
against the promise of a much larger return. Concretely, the confidence tricksters start by sending 
to their prospective victims faxes or email messages that generally rely on the symbols of 
Nigeria’s petroleum industry or state apparatuses. In these letters, the fraudsters who generally 
impersonate government officials, top-raking military officers, bank managers, oil industry 
executives, high-profile politicians, or even relatives of a deceased African head of State, claim 
to be in possession of millions of dollar obtained by fraudulent means, and frozen in an African 
bank account or a safety deposit location. The recipients of the letters are asked for assistance in 
transferring the funds out of the continent, and are promised to receive in turn a percentage 
(between 30 to 50%) of the hidden funds. The positive reply to the scammers' messages is an 
indication that the recipients are willing mougous. Several mail exchanges or phone 
conversations will help the fraudsters win the dupes' trust, who will not hesitate to send them 
details of their bank account. Such information are useful not only because they enable the 
fraudsters to withdraw money from their victims' bank account, but also because they can help 
them to apply for credit cards, ask for loans to the victims' banks, or forge cheques useful for 
illegal bank transactions. 
Perpetrators of sophisticated financial scams and bank frauds which require exceptional 
technical know-how, coordination of large number of people, and infiltration of the banking 
                                                                                                                                                                  
source that in the UK, the average victim is conned out of more than £50,000. 
3 Cf. ThisisNewNottingham online, 22 May 2004; especially the article: ‘Operation zero will net victim just like that.’ 
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system are rather Nigerian kingpins of '419' fraud, who generally operate within loosely 
organized criminal groups supposedly connected by ethnic bounds. This is the case with the 
notorious Nigerian transnational crime syndicate that is reportedly controlled by what some 
observers now refer to as Igbo Mafia who allegedly makes use of the social capital of ethnicity, 
kinship lineage and place of origin to prosper in criminal activities (Bayart et al. 1999: 40). 
According to Smith (2007: 38), Nigerian criminal networks that reportedly control multimillion 
of dollars derived from their fraudulent business schemes, also rely on clientelist relationships 
that permeate both the government and the private sector, and on the ties that Nigerians at home 
generally maintain with their fellow compatriots living abroad. These international networks of 
crime, which often work together with the Colombian, Russian, Chinese and Italian crime 
syndicates, are increasingly involved in drug smuggling, money laundering, bank fraud, 419 
scams, counterfeiting of foreign currencies and credit cards, etc. Top figures of Nigerian crime 
syndicates often recruit individuals to infiltrate bank workers or bribe employees who can 
provide them with critical information about customers' bank accounts and addresses. Glickman 
(2005: 471) has revealed that '419' scammers also take advantage of internet insecurity to prey 
on banks and individuals. Not surprising that many western banks have been victims of some 
cunning Nigerian scammers who set up fake websites resembling their legitimate sites. 
Unsuspecting customers logging in these bogus websites are far from imagining that they are 
revealing of their own volition their personal information to smart smooth criminals who will use 
them to drain their accounts or to perpetrate bank frauds. Symptomatic of this bank fraud is the 
Citybank of London which has become one of the main targets of some West African fraudsters 
who regularly impersonate the bank's website to swindle its clients (Catan and Peel 2003). A 
German industrialist reportedly lost £1 million in such a sophisticated scam crafted by these 
cunning African hustlers (Glickman, ibid: 471-72).  
Students of West African criminal networks will find a correspondence between the 
practice of feymania and the criminal business deal commonly glossed as '419' of which young 
Nigerian nationals are key actors. Indeed, Cameroonian feymen bear a close resemblance to 
Nigerian advance-fee scammers, since both have made dirty tricks a primary means of 
accumulating wealth, and are engaged in what can be termed a moral economy of swindle, 
hoodwinking, double-dealing and fraud, which has taken a dramatic turn in Cameroon and 
Nigeria. In addition, both are involved in what Apter (2005: 13) would call 'the economy of 
images and appearances' that produces value from floating signifiers. However, these similarities 
should not make us lose sight of the significant differences that exist between Cameroonian 
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feymen and Nigerian 419 scammers in terms of itineraries of accumulation, social strategies or 
relationships with the postcolonial state. For example, like their politico-bureaucratic elites with 
whom they maintain clientelist relationships, many Nigerian kingpins of organised crime 
generally achieve their fraudulent activities in the nexus of the Nigerian postcolonial state and 
within the pervasive networks of patronage and reciprocity, that according to Smith (2007:13), 
constitute a significant proportion of the everyday political economy in Nigeria. They do it, not 
only by securing political support from some local big men and influential government or state 
officials, but also by making use of both government facilities and symbols of the Nigerian state. 
The centrality of the Nigerian state in the 419 scam is epitomized by the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporate (NNPC). For example, a significant number of Nigerian scammers who 
send email-scams to their prospective marks generally impersonate the insignia of this famous 
and respectable state-owned company, which embodies the Nigerian-driven oil economy. It is 
this proximity with different structures of the postcolonial state that has led some analysts to 
interpret the practice of '419' as one of new forms of corruption and criminalization of the 
Nigerian state that emerged in the late 1980s under the former regime of General Babangida also 
nicknamed 'Maradona' (after the famous Argentine football player), for his ability to play a 
confidence trick on both his political opponents and the international community (Apter 1999: 
267-307, 2005; Smith 2007). 
While, what is distinctive about feymen is the fact that, contrary to the older generation of 
Cameroonian businessmen and financial elites whose business interests were (and are still) 
closely connected with those of the politico-bureaucratic bourgeoisie (Bayart 1993: 95), a great 
number of prominent feymen who mostly come from underprivileged social backgrounds 
initially distanced themselves from the state officials and politicians with whom they shared no 
social backgrounds, much less cultural affiliations4. In addition, since the emergence of 
feymania-related practices in the early 1990s, most of successful confidence tricksters have 
tended to downplay the importance of the corrupt and clientelist state in access to financial and 
material resources, and thus freeing themselves from the state's paternalism and the whims of the 
local big men. In addition, in their accumulative project, many prominent tricky businessmen are 
inclined to give priority to ‘alternative modes of accumulation’ (Geschiere and Konings, 1993) 
which challenge the officially sanctioned modes of creation and distribution of riches in 
postcolonial Cameroon. That is why feymania-related practices first appeared as a ‘popular mode 
                                                 
4This conflicting relationship with the ruling CPDM regime was dramatized by the fact hat most young people turned 
feymen were urban marginalized Bamileke youths who originated from a region generally considered hostile to 
President Biya in power since 1982. 
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of political action’ (Bayart et al. 1992) or a ‘hidden transcript of resistance’ (Scott 1990) that was 
essentially directed against the dominant groups, since most of the victims of feymen’s 
confidence tricks were either the politico-bureaucratic elites or wealthy businessmen connected 
to the ruling CPDM regime5.  
 
Criminalize and swindle the West  
The globalization, or at least the internationalisation of both the feymania-related practices and 
the '419' scam is one of the most notable changes that occurred these recent years in these two 
types of fraudulent business deals. Symptomatic of this globalisation of west African organized 
crime is the propensity of many West African criminal entrepreneurs to expand their swindling 
operations on a worldwide scale, thus making use of both ‘resources of extraversion’ (Bayart 
1993) and accumulative opportunities provided by the present global capitalism that often 
permits to secure instant wealth and without great effort. Indeed, like many other West African 
criminal operators such as the Congolese traffickers, Liberian fraudsters and Ivorian email 
hustlers, the new generations of Nigerian 419 scammers and Cameroonian feymen have since the 
early 1990s for the former, and the mid 1990s for the latter, embarked on a global process of 
crime and fraud, suggesting that it is not only the Black continent and its political elites who 
indulge in criminal and fraudulent practices on the large scale, as some analysts have upheld 
about Africa (Bayart et al. 1999:20). According to Andrew Apter (2005: 228), the globalisation 
of the '419' scam in the early 1990s was prompted by the decision of Babangida regime (1985-
1993) to deregulate the banking system and foreign-exchange market, and especially by the drop 
in the world price of the oil which plunged the Naira (Nigerian currency) into a dramatic spiral 
of devaluation. The steady loss of value of their national currency against international 
currencies such as the US or Canadian Dollar, the British Pound caused many Nigerian con 
artists to search for foreign dupes, most notably Western marks, from whom they could extort 
hard currencies in order to compensate a Naria turned a 'monkey money' or worthless paper. By 
                                                 
5 However it is important to relativize or nuance this subversive character of feymania-related practices, because, as we 
have demonstrated elsewhere (Ndjio 2006), these activities have also become an integral part of the ruling CPDM 
regime’s policy of plundering or 'eating' the state. This is because, in its attempt to curb the growing influence of 
independent Bamileke feymen who have always tended to bypass its importance, the Cameroon government has 
encouraged the emergence of compliant and manipulable feymen from the President's own ethnic group (the Beti from 
the forest region of Cameroon), who rather owe their economic success to their ability to take advantage of the 
patrimonial and corrupt character of the Biya regime. Moreover, unlike most Bamileke feymen, the wealth and social 
promotion of members of what Cameroonian disparagingly call 'feymen du Renouveau' (the Renouveau or New Deal in 
English, is the official designation of the Biya regime) stem from their connections with holders of political power. 
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deciding to internationalize their fraudulent business activities, these Nigerian fraudsters were 
only inserting themselves into the globalized market and finance capitalism which, as Comaroff 
and Comaroff (2001) have convincingly shown, open up the potential for venture enterprises and 
criminal practices.  
As far as feymania is concerned, its internationalisation was rather the result of the effort 
of the Cameroonian government to 'enslave' successful feymen into both the localizing 
framework of ethno-politics and the 'politics of the belly' (Bayart 1993). In my previous research 
(Ndjio 2001, 2006) on Cameroonian confidence tricksters, I demonstrated that this attempt by 
the ruling CPDM regime to domesticate the newly emerging class of wealthy hustlers led many 
prominent feymen who had little connections with official lucrative networks of patronage to 
search for accumulative opportunities outside their home country. Moreover, the state's 
hegemonic ambition on this independent class of nouveaux riches propelled the emergence of 
what I referred to as 'globalizing feymen' who tended to carry out their swindle operations on a 
worldwide scale. But, unlike the older generations of feymen who always came back home with 
their ‘spoil,’ these new generations of professional swindlers were rather inclined to establish 
themselves abroad because they were sceptical about the future of their home country.  
There are also a number of factors that can explain why the newly emerging group of 
young Nigerian and Cameroonian 'criminal' entrepreneurs decided by mid 1990s to search for 
new pastures outside their continent. The first one was the saturation of the African front (a place 
where a swindling operation is carried out) which was no longer attractive, as some transnational 
confidence tricksters from Paris and London once confided in me during an interview conducted 
in November 2004. This saturation was itself prompted by the rush of many young Nigerians and 
Cameroonians for '419' and feymania-related activities, which offered socially and economically 
marginalized youths of both countries a perspective of gaining access to wealth from which they 
were excluded by their corrupt and patrimonial governments. The second factor was the growing 
setbacks of feymen and 419 scammers in many sub-Saharan countries where they could no 
longer get up to their old tricks because most of their potential mougous were now aware of 
them, thanks to their government’s warning, but also because some of them had already been 
taken in by Cameroonian and Nigerian con artists. Finally, following the spectacular coups 
achieved by some notorious feymen and 419 scammers in a number of African countries, local 
authorities had decided to wage a bitter war on these ‘unscrupulous foreigners’ who ‘not only 
were harming the economy of their country, but also were teaching the local population how to 
become dishonest and immoral,’ to quote Theodor Obiang Nguema, the Equatorial Guinean 
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President6. As a result of these though measures against West African criminals, throughout 
Africa, feymen and 419 scammers were hunted down, arrested, harshly beaten up, jailed, and 
sometimes shot dead or burnt alive, either by the local police or population, as it happened in 
South Africa and Botswana in mid-1990s7. 
More important is the fact that this globalisation of West African organized crime seems 
to take the form of a special kind of ‘westernization,’ since most of these ring gangs are now 
based in Western countries where they pursue their economic delinquencies. Giving that a great 
number of young African immigrants who reside in Western countries now live on the informal 
or criminal economy, one cannot help asking if the West is not mimicking sub-Saharan Africa in 
a steady move towards the informalization and criminalization of its economy. One might be 
tempted to answer in the affirmative, if one acknowledges the fact that many of these western 
countries have become hubs for West African organized crime, and that in many districts or 
neighbourhoods of the major European or North American cities, African criminal networks 
manage to launder the proceeds of their criminal activities in formal enterprises, and more 
importantly, oversee the growing shadow economy that is being developed in the very heart of 
the late modern capitalism. This is the case with the 17th Arrondissement, and most notably 
Château d’Eau and Château Rouge, La Gare du Nord neighbourhoods in Paris, the Quartier 
Matongue in Brussels, the Bijlmer neighbourhood in the suburb of Amsterdam, and the 
Northwest region of London. As I observed during my fieldwork in those popular areas, some 
big bosses of west African crime syndicates ran through their relatives or front men many 
African nightclubs, clandestine bars, cafés, hostels, restaurants, beauty saloons, and 
haberdasheries (see also MacGaffey and Bazenguissa 2000). They also controlled the burgeoning 
illegal activities which irrigated the local economy. This is confirmed by a special report that 
France 2, a French government-run TV, broadcast on the 13 October 2005 about what the 
reporter called ‘underground economy’ that, according to him, was widespread in most banlieues 
(disenfranchised neighbourhoods mostly populated by African and Arab immigrants) of Paris. 
During this programme, one of the police officers whose special unit was involved in the fight 
against organized crime in these disenfranchised suburbs lamented about the fact that most 
criminal networks which were involved in theft of luxury cars, drug trafficking, confidence trick, 
counterfeiting of bank notes and credit cards were controlled by young African criminal 
                                                 
6The man himself was said to be one of the victims of some feymen who reportedly swindled several million CFA out 
of him (see Mutations, 15 May 1999; Malaquais, 2001: 101-18) 
7Cf. La Nouvelle Expression, 05 July 1996; La Colombe, 12 May 2000; Le Messager, 9 February 2000. See also 
Glickman (2005:460-89) 
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operators originating from West and Central Africa. According to this police officer, his unit was 
created in reaction to the criminalization of the main suburbs of Paris by African organized crime 
syndicates. He and his team were particularly concerned about the actions of Ivorian and 
Congolese fraudsters, and Cameroonian confidence tricksters and professional swindlers who 
regularly extorted money from some naïve and avaricious local merchants and businessmen who 
were hungry enough for a quick buck.  
As the above example shows, the relocalisation of feymen’s and 419 scammers' criminal 
activities in Western countries has gone along with the ‘whitization’ of their victims; that is, 
turning many White people into what is known in the feymen milieu as gros pigeons (big suckers 
or dupes). Indeed, unlike their predecessors who essentially preyed on African politicians and 
businessmen (Malaquais 2001:101-18; Ndjio 2006) ― as alluded to earlier― , the younger 
generations of Cameroonian swindlers and Nigerian 419 scammers rather tend to bamboozle 
White middle-classes who have become the main victims of their dirty tricks and 'art of 
composition’, as Cameroonian feymen often say. There are many examples of western 
politicians, professionals, businessmen or entrepreneurs who have fallen prey to some young 
African hustlers and confidence tricksters who lured them into providing advance fees against 
the promise of larger payoffs. For example in 2001, the Canadian newspaper Canada Newswire 
reported story about a fraud ring of Toronto-based Nigerian hustlers who managed to defraud 
three hundred Canadian citizens in a large sophisticated scam. Individual losses rolled from $ 52 
000 to over $5 million8. This large swindling operation was reminiscent of the scam perpetrated 
a few years earlier by some cunning Nigerian hustlers against a former American congressman 
and a Texas oil executive from whom they swindled several $ million9 Like the avaricious Texan 
entrepreneur and politician, many greedy and gullible Americans have lost millions of dollar in 
sophisticated business frauds and scams pulled off by some kingpins of West African organised 
crime10. In a previous work on feymen, I related a story about a young Cameroonian lady who 
helped in 2000 a ring of five France-based Cameroonian confidence tricksters to defraud FF 20 
million (more than $4 million) from a wealthy banker from Luxembourg, who was then her 
partner. To win over her naive companion, the cunning woman invested her personal savings and 
jewellery in the swindling operation, knowing that she would get them back when she and her 
associates met somewhere in the town to share their haul (Ndjio 2006, especially chap IV). More 
                                                 
8 Quoted by Glickman (2005: 479) 
9See Brady (2003); Glickman(2005: 460-89) 
10Cf. ABC news on 5 September 2000. 
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dramatic was the fact that the mark did not only lose all his fortune in this money doubling scam 
crafted by these young Cameroonian con artists. He also found himself deeply indebted to his 
bank. The question one can ask here is: what enable Cameroonian and Nigerian confidence 
tricksters to bait their white victims (who are often experienced professionals or well-advised 
politicians) into investing their money into their shady businesses? 
The comments made by a young Bamileke feyman from Paris— quoted earlier—, who 
believed that feymania-related activities thrived in western countries only because there existed 
some naive and greedy White fellows who wanted to make windfall profits, seemed to suggest 
that young West African smooth criminals exploited to their own advantage both the naivety and 
avarice of some Westerners to con them. However, some analysts have pertinently noted that 
Cameroonian and Nigerian confidence tricksters generally play on the West's racist and 
ethnocentric stereotypes about Africans and their continent to achieve their business frauds and 
scams (Apter 2005, Glickman 2005: 460-89). Some of these received ideas often take for granted 
that Africans are inexperienced and naive in business, and incapable of understanding the 
subtlety and complexity of the global capitalism. Other clichés that are still unfortunately still 
prevalent in much of the western mainstream literature on Africa, hold it for true that Africans 
don't know the value of money because they build wealth in people and knowledge, and not in 
ruthless acquisition of money and material resources (Guyer 1993, 1995). In the West is also 
widely believed that Africa is a place where it is easy for western foreigners to make fantastic 
profits in a spam of little time or to strike good deals because of the widespread practice of 
corruption, and especially the criminal behaviour of many African political elites. For example, 
Apter (2005: 233) has mentioned a case of 419 scam involving a Canadian real estate broker 
who, despite losing $ 60 000, was so taken in by his Nigerian associates that he still believed that 
they were sincere in their efforts to keep $ 32 million out of the hands of corrupt and 
kleptomaniac Nigerian officials. Like many Nigerian-crafted scams, this swindling operation was 
premised on Nigeria's worldwide reputation for corruption and criminalisation of the state by 
venal politicians and bureaucrats who have made their country be perceived by the western 
watchdog Transparency International as one of the most corrupt and criminal countries in the 
world. It often happens that in their bid to pull off their scams, some young African hustlers, 
most notably Ivorian fraudsters who have joined Nigerian 419 scammers in the performance of 
the art of con games, rather exploit both the Westerners' paternalistic and pitiful attitude the 
towards Africans, and the clichés of horror and tragedy that pervade most western media when it 
comes to depicting the Black continent. Little wonder that in many 419 scam letters that they 
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send to their White marks, West African con(wo) men generally attempt to lure the unsuspecting 
recipients into a false belief that they are dealing with naive and unfortunate Africans who 
desperately need some help. For example in early 2004, one colleague from the University of 
Amsterdam received an email scam from a young Ivorian woman (even if he suspected that the 
sender was a Nigerian national) who passed herself off as the daughter's of the late General 
Robert Gueye, the former Ivorian military ruler who was killed together with his wife and aides 
in a failed coup attempt perpetrated in September 2002 by a group of assailants coming from the 
Northern region of the country. The recipient was asked for assistance in transferring $20 million 
that were secretly hidden somewhere in a neighbouring country into a bank account in Europe in 
exchange for a substantial percentage (40%) with discretion. More interesting in this email was 
the fact that it dramatized to excess the political turmoil in Ivory Coast, and especially the 
persecutions that close relatives of the former head of state were enduring under the regime of 
President Laurent Gbagbo. I came across this mail because my then colleague, who had little 
knowledge of the sagacity spirit of some Africans, was so touched by the pathetic story 
concocted by the young African lady that he wanted to share his compassion and sympathy with 
an African colleague, who might have experienced a similar hardship in 'the heart of darkness' 
continent.  
My investigation among young Cameroonian feymen from Paris and London revealed 
that some cunning African international swindlers also took advantage of the ignorance of many 
Westerners of African society and culture. For example, the young Cameroonian lady mentioned 
earlier fooled her naive White lover into believing that her implication in the deal would secure 
his fortune, and especially would prevent the tricksters who were her village fellows to con him 
because in the Bamileke custom, cheating one's kith and kin brings ill luck and misfortune. 
Obviously, the cunning lady was playing on the general cliché that both traditional and modern 
African societies at large are essentially guided by the system of kinship, and the principle of 
communal socialities and mutual obligation that ensure individuals ‘protective solidarities’, but 
hinder their individualisation; that is, their emergence as ‘autonomous actors’ (Marie 1997). If 
the 'good man' of Luxembourg had read Alain Marie's L'Afrique des Individus (1997), he would 
have been aware of the fact that, in their expression of ‘individualisation’ and their practice of 
sagacity, some Africans have no qualms about flouting the traditional system of kinship, or 
challenging the tyrannical power of community and ethnicity. Were he familiar with the popular 
literature in Cameroon, he would have known that in this country, as in many African countries, 
both the 'invention du quotidien' and the 'art de faire'(de Certeau 1980) also coincide with what 
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Dominique Malaquais (2001: 101-18) aptly calls the 'art de feyre'. That is, the art of defrauding 
or taking an unfair advantage of a fellow who is fool enough to trust you.  
 
Reinventing the global capitalism 
One of the unexpected turns of the peripheral insertion of the Black continent into the world 
economy, and the economic crisis many African countries have been experiencing since the late 
1980s, is indisputably the recent emergence in this continent of new modes of capitalization of 
wealth that today encourage new economic conducts and new ethos of accumulation that end up 
rendering obsolete the old system of business transactions and economic entrepreneurship. More 
important is the fact that this new art of making money heralds a shift in common understandings 
of the nature of capitalism and business activities, as well as it is preparing the ground for what 
Janet MacGaffey (1994: 189-204) aptly calls ‘African capitalism’ which has not yet been 
sufficiently theorized. What particularly marks out this African capitalism is less the fact that it 
essentially lives on fraud, prevarication and other fraudulent practices, than the fact that it 
clutters itself very little with ethical values and moral principles which, according to Max Weber 
([1920]1958), guided the behaviour of Protestant capitalists of eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. 
In many respects, Nigerian advance-fee fraud and Cameroonian feymania are the 
embodiment of these unconventional business ventures and unorthodox economic practices that 
undermine the established logic of international financial transactions, as well as they encourage 
a steady loss of ethics and moral principles in business and economic activities (Brittan and 
Hamlin 1995; Reidenbach and Robin 1989; Sen 1985, 1995: 23-34). More importantly, both 
feymania and ‘419’ scam herald a Second Coming of capitalism, not in its millennial, neo-liberal 
and global manifestations, as forecast by Comaroff and Comaroff (2001), but rather in its 
criminal, felonious and venal expressions. By this, we means that we are dealing with a kind of 
unlawful business deals and non-standard ways of bargaining and trading exchanges that 
prefigure a new form of entrepreneurship in which business people are turned into immoral 
economic agents whose actions are essentially driven by ‘ruthless acquisition, bound to no 
ethical norms whatever,’ as Max Weber ([1920]1958: 71) would say. Little wonder that since the 
mid 1990s, many self-appointed western criminal 'experts' have been producing both 'grand 
narratives', and sometimes a phantasmagorical literature about the expansion of the so-called 
'global transnational criminality' in general, and 'west African organized crime' in particular, 
which allegedly threatens the very foundation of both the market economy and the liberal 
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democracy (Favarel-Garrigues et al. 2002; Handelman 1995; Maillard 2001; Naylor 2002; 
Strange 1998; Varese 2001). In so doing, they join their governments in both their lamentations 
and panic about the progressive transformation of the global capitalism into a global economy of 
crime and venality, in which business ventures are assimilated to criminal enterprises. Western 
academics, politicians and policy markers particularly worry about the propagation of what John 
Flemming, the former chief economist for the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, has referred to as 'Mafia capitalism' (Flemming 1995: 45-56) which, according to 
him, is based on the effort to create riches by appeal to techniques that contravene both national 
and international laws and conventions governing economic activities. These recent years, this 
general concern has led in most western countries to real political, administrative and juridical 
offensives against the méchant African criminals who have become the nightmare for many 
western governments and financial institutions trapped into the nets of west African economy of 
fraud and hoodwinking. Apter (2005: 228) reveals for example that financial scams and business 
frauds perpetrated in many parts of the world by members of West African organized crime have 
now 'engaged the energies of Scotland Yard, the FBI, Interpol, the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police, and a variety of private and subsidiary agencies, such as Better Business Bureau and the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network in the US'. The criminal activities of some young 
African international swindlers in Western countries also give a headache to the British MPFA 
(Metropolitan Police Fraud Alert) and WAOCS (West African Organized Crime Section), the 
American NCIS (National Criminal Intelligence Service), and the Dutch Dienst Nationale 
Recherche Informatie Landelijk Bureau Fraude (Dutch National Bureau of the Financial Crime 
Unit) of the Dutch National Bureau of Investigation, which have been conducting an 
investigation into worldwide fraud practices of '419 fraud' and confidence trick. 
The fact that young African criminal entrepreneurs such the notorious Nigerian '419' 
scammers and Cameroonian feymen who are increasingly active in Western Europe and North 
America, have compelled many western governments to set up anti-fraud units to combat what 
many criminal experts now label 'west African organized crime' can be cynically interpreted as a 
revenge of African sans culottes against the global economic system that only marginalizes or 
peripherizes African in the world economy. The fact that young Ivorian fraudsters and Congolese 
mikilistes have forced many French and Belgian banks to invest millions of dollar in tightening 
their banking security against the theft of identity is also a strong reminder that Africans refuse to 
play a passive role in the global market, or to occupy the position of underdogs in the world 
economic game. 
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Whether one limits the behaviour of these young African con artists to criminal practices (Hibou 
1999: 70-113; Malaquais 2001), whether one interprets their economic delinquency either as an 
avatar of the neo-liberal capitalism which has always put up with business frauds (Bayart 2004), 
the truth is that young West African transnational swindlers and professional tricksters have 
nowadays engaged in a process of redefinition of the cannons and rules of the global economic 
games, which have so far been set by the West. They are especially involved in a symbolic 
destabilisation of the hegemonic order that western developed countries have always maintained 
in their commercial and economic transactions with African countries. And one of the often-
neglected dimensions of the practices of feymania and ‘419’ scam is that since the mid 1990s, 
both have been embodying what can be provisionally called African modes of capitalism or 
Africa’s work on capitalism. These African practices of capitalism embody the conscious or 
unconscious effort of African confidence tricksters and professional fraudsters to africanize what 
is still perceived by many as an alienating economic system, and especially to reinvent the 
global capitalism, as alluded to earlier in the introduction of this paper. Though Bayart (1994), 
following the French historian Fernand Braudel (1985), was one of the first analysts to advance 
the hypothesis of 'reinvention of capitalism' as a result of its global expansion, our use of this 
concept is different from his. In general, by reinvention of (global) capitalism, he means 'the 
emergence of differentiation in the logics of capitalism, the change in the way of accumulation 
and consumption, and the method and spirit of industrial management' (ibid, 15). Bayart 
especially discusses this reinvention with respect to the emergence or exacerbation of culturalist 
particularisms in business economic activities, the use of identity strategies in the individual or 
collective attempt to gain access to wealth and material resources. In addition, he understands 
this expression as 'a way of making the erosion of the homogenizing aspects of the global 
capitalism' (p.250). In short for him, the reinvention of capitalism goes along with the 
'reinvention of difference' ―a concept borrowed from James Clifford (1988). 
In this contribution, we rather understand the concept 'reinvention of capitalism' as an 
African project of reshaping or re-forming both the classical art of enterprising and trading, and 
the global dominant economic order that has until now profited Western developed countries. 
This programme entails not only the re-appropriation of the rationality and logics that inform the 
present global economy, but also the questioning of the established norms, ethical codes and laws 
that regulate the economic activities at both local and international levels. By 'reinvention of 
global capitalism', we particularly make reference to an unprecedented insidious undermining 
work that some young cunning African transnational swindlers and professional tricksters have 
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been exerting on the world economy, and which is exacerbating the corruption of its 
conventional norms and systems of values.  
One of the most expressive forms of this denaturalisation of the neo-capitalist system is 
its slow conversion by Cameroonian feymen and Nigerian 419 scammers into a transnational 
economy of swindle and fraud in which deception is no longer a substitute or an 'alternative 
mode of accumulation' (Geschiere and Konings 1993), but is rather the driving force of 
economic entrepreneurship and business ventures, and especially the main methods of making 
money. Indeed, with the practices of feymania and 419 scam, we are no longer dealing with more 
classical forms of illegal activities, which sometimes straddle the licit and the illicit, or combine 
both the legal and illegal enterprises, as the work of Janet MacGaffey (1992: 514-24; 1998: 37-
50; see also MacGaffey and Bazenguissa 2000) has convincingly demonstrated. Instead, we bear 
witness of the emergence of unprecedented forms of criminal business practices which, not only 
make the violation of business rules and economic conventions a norm, but also promote the 
normalisation of the economy of deception and trickery, the aestheticisation of criminality and 
venality, the routinization of business frauds, the moralisation and ethicisation of dishonesty and 
double-dealing, and the immoralisation of honesty and rectitude, insofar as in both feymania and 
419 scam, righteousness and virtue are viewed as a vice or a luxury that the hustlers cannot 
afford. This implies that those who are involved in this economy of false (faux) and forgery that 
goes along with unethical values and deceptive ethics, reject what McCloskey (2006) calls 
'bourgeois virtues', which generally associate economic success with moral codes or behavioural 
ethics (Beauchamp and Bowie 1992; de George 1982; Reidenbach and Robin 1989; Sen 1987, 
1995: 23-34; Weber [1920]1958). For example, members of a ring gang of feymen we followed 
in Paris between June and September 2002 had for maxim what can be summarized as: 'In 
business, it is dishonest to be honest because everybody is dishonest' (Ndjio 2006). Even among 
these 'thieves' who generally paid lip service to moral principles and ethic values, there were no 
honour, since they tended to play a confidence trick even on their own cronies or partners with 
whom they conspired to swindle some unscrupulous Westerner dupes.  
Another critical aspect of this reinvention of global capitalism is its transmutation into a 
vast economy of illusion and simulacrum in which success in business ventures mainly depends 
on the 'performance of the art of con games' which involves stagecraft, impersonation, and those 
'collusive fabrications' as Apter (2005: 228) would put it. In this moral economy of masquerade, 
delusion and semblance, the achievement of dirty tricks and economic malpractice also rests on 
one's ability to cover one's real project and activities, conceal one's real motives and intention, or 
flout one's true identity; in short to 'wear the mask of appearance', as Suzanne Brenner (1998) 
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would say. For example, to win over his/her victim, the swindler-entrepreneur must pretend to be 
not what he/she is really, but someone else; that is, a honest businessperson or a money-doubling' 
expert who knows how to produce bank notes, and even a good person (benefactor) who just 
wants to help his/her fellow to accrue his/her capital, and not a vulgar crook or a smooth criminal 
(malefactor) who only lusts after his/her victim’s money. However, the trickster's simulacrum or 
dédoublement (split personality) is only intended to deceive the mark. For, as Apter (ibid, 234) 
remind us, in the world of '419' scam and confidence trick, the 'truth-value of the appearances' is 
never shared by both parties, because what is true for the dupe is not for the confidence trickster; 
what the mougou takes for real and is ready to invest all his/her fortune, is only mise-en-scène, 
appearance and fabrication whose fictitious character will be only revealed when the con game 
or fool bargain is over. That is, when the hustler has absconded with the mark's money, leaving 
his/her victim only with bogus documents and fake addresses. Such 'unequal terms of social 
interaction' that create 'unequal terms of financial exchange' (Apter, ibid: 234) are always 
profitable to the same person: the trickster. 
We are conscious of the fact that some analysts would argue against our hypothesis about 
the African reinvention of global capitalism that fraud, deception, and trickery have always been 
common practices in capitalist system (Warnier 1994: 185), and have played a critical role in 
capital formation in western economies (Harvey 1989). Others would probably point out that the 
activities or practices we are describing are only one of the most radical expressions of the 
dynamism of global capitalism so well captured by Braudel (1985)11. But when these critiques 
have been conceded, what remains undeniable and irrefutable is the observation that both 
feymania and ‘419’ scam confront us with new forms of entrepreneurship in which the classical 
principles: 'Honesty is the best Policy' ― so dear to puritan capitalists of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries ― has been replaced by 'Dishonesty is the best policy'. In addition, with 
these business malpractices, we are witnessing the emergence of a specific economy of duplicity 
and treachery in which a business partner is seen above all as a dupe to swindle or a gros pigeon 
to fleece. However, what is most sticking in both feymania and advance-fee fraud is less the fact 
that ‘money changes hands in one direction only, despite the expectations of a return’, as (Apter 
2005: 234) has observed about Nigerian 419 scam, than the fact that the betrayal of one's 
partner's trust is common practice. What we are making reference to is a kind of immoral 
business deals, in which dirty tricks are no longer marginal or trivial practices developed on the 
margins of normal economic activities, but are rather integral aspects of business transactions 
                                                 
11 For Braudel (1985:78), the main characteristic of capitalism is its 'flexibility', 'adaptability' and 'eclecticism'.  
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and exchanges. Elsewhere (Ndjio 2002b), we referred to these business malpractices as both the 
‘economy of distrust’ (sans confiance) and ‘breach of trust’ (abus de confiance). For if the art of 
feymania and '419' scam is the art of con game which entails above all engaging the mark into 
'magical deals' which generally lead him/her nicely into magical tricks, it also implies trapping 
the dupe in a fool’s bargain in which he/she gives everything, but receives nothing in turn. 
Moreover, in this kind of tricky game, one party strongly believes that to win or achieve his/her 
objectives (accruing his/her capital), he/she must put all his/her confidence in the other 
contractor who has all the reasons to be smart, or to take unfair advantage of his/her partner’s 
trust. That is why the art of confidence trick is generally associated with both the regime of 
disloyalty and dishonesty (Ndjio 2002b).  
 
Conclusion 
 
In many respects, both Nigerian advance fee-fraud and Cameroonian feymania are one of the 
new types of business malpractices, and economy of illusion and magic trick that came forth by 
the late 1980s and early 1990s in a context of disappointed expectations, broken contracts, and 
unfulfilled national development plans (Apter 2005: 226). More importantly, both are of the most 
radical expressions of what we referred elsewhere (Ndjio, forthcoming) as 'African sagacity 
spirit', which enable both the elites and the commoners not only to adapt to modern changes, but 
also to invent new opportunities for enrichment in an atmosphere marked by economic decline, 
austerity and drastic structural adjustment measures imposed by international financial 
institutions, and above all, by the dwindling of state resources (de Boeck 1998; 777-809; Hibou 
2004; Jua 2003: 13-36; Konings 2006; Trefon 2004). Unfortunately, both western government 
criminal investigations and the mainstream academic literature on the topic have so far limited 
the understanding of these business malpractices and economic malfeasances either to the 
growing process of criminalization of the state in Africa (Bayart 1999: 114-16, 2004; Hibou 
1999: 70-113, 2004; Malaquais 2001: 101-18) or to the rampant political culture of fraud, 
corruption and deception in postcolonial Africa (Apter 2005; Glickman 2005:460-89; Smith 
2007). In other words, ordinary Nigerians and Cameroonians who try their hands at advance-fee 
fraud and feymania are only mimicking the criminal and venal attitude of their state-based elites 
who have notorious for siphoning the state resources into private pockets.  
 Though we sympathize with both the theories of the criminalization and corruption, we 
think that they have failed not only to chart the shift recorded this last decade in the so-called 
west African transnational crime, but also to grasp the relation between the growth in the 
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economy of swindle and confidence trick, and the emergence of immoral business practices and 
felonious capitalism that aggravate the erosion of ethics and morality in international business 
and economic activities, the dramatization of alternative modes of accumulation that sometimes 
downplay the importance of the African postcolonial state as the major centre of production and 
redistribution of wealth, the effort of some cunning young African business adventurers to 
transform the mode of doing business at both national and international levels, and the 
constitution of new class of nouveaux riches that sometimes assert their independence towards 
the political and bureaucratic elites, as is the case with many prominent feymen. It is a pity that 
both academics and experts have given insufficient attention to the strategies of malfeasance of 
young Cameroonian feymen and Nigerian advance fee fraudsters, their subversive play of the 
logics of neo-liberal capitalism, and their audacious challenge of the ethical and judicial codes 
and that inform the global economic activities. We have shown in this paper that one of the 
remarkable forms of African work on the global capitalism, was its mischievous transformation 
by young African business adventurers and transnational confidence tricksters into a global 
economy of magic trick and dissimulation. In this moral economy of dishonesty in which ethics 
no longer makes sense, business transactions are turned into a fool bargain: one business partner 
acting as the truant (trickster) and another playing the naive role of the bon (dupe or mark) who 
invests everything for receiving nothing. This third world mimic of global economy, as Homi 
Bhabha (1994) would put it, embodies not only African bricolages (patched-up jobs) of 
capitalism, but also the effort of some Africans to 'reinvent' the global capitalist system. Though 
some critics might disagree with our interpretation of feymania and '419' scam, we believe that a 
radical form taken by this economic of swindle and deception suggests that a new form of 
entrepreneurship may be emerging not only in Africa, but across the world, if acknowledges the 
fact young Cameroonian and Nigerian international swindlers and confidence tricksters are now 
exporting their expertise and craft in places as remote as the Caribbean, Philippines, Russia, 
China, Hong Kong, and Singapore (Roberts 2002; Perry 2003). 
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